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A B S T R A C T
The 5G mobile network is embracing new technologies to keep providing network subscribers with a high
Quality of Service (QoS). However, this has become increasingly difficult in the urban landscape as more
devices are being connected and each device is requesting increasing amounts of data. Network operators
rely on the small cell technology to maintain coverage and service for its subscribers, but this technology is
incapable of mitigating the increasing workload on the network infrastructure and preventing the associated
network delays. The next logical step is to cover the urban landscape with mobile small cells, since these take
advantage of the dynamic network topology and optimizes network services in a cost-effective fashion while
taking advantage of the high device density. However, the introduction of mobile small cells raises various
security challenges. Cryptographic solutions are capable of solving these as long as they are supported by an
appropriate key management scheme. In this article, we propose DISTANT: a DIStributed Trusted Authority-
based key managemeNT scheme. This key management scheme is specifically designed to provide security in
a network which takes advantage of the mobile small cell technology. The scheme relies on threshold secret
sharing to decentralize trust and utilizes the self-generated certificates paradigm. Through an extensive security
analysis and communication overhead evaluation, we conclude that our design provides an improved level of
security and has a low communication overhead compared to previous works.. Introduction
The mobile network entered the 5G era, bringing emerging network-
ng technologies to handle the immense growth of the mobile network.
he mobile network had approximately 6.5 billion connected devices,
equesting 0.9 exabytes of mobile data per month by 2012 [1]. It is
orecasted that the number of connected devices will grow to 12.3
illion by 2022, requesting 77 exabytes of mobile data per month [2].
his surge puts a lot of pressure on the mobile network which has
o share its resources and will undoubtedly lead to a reduction in the
elivered QoS.
To address these challenges, new technologies are emerging to
reate the next generation 5G network. One of these is the small cell
echnology [3]. This technology is based on the femto-cell paradigm
nd is realized by installing small and low powered radio access nodes
o provide coverage in densely populated areas. These nodes act as mini
ase stations and provide significant benefits such as reduced power
onsumption, increased data rates and reduced latency. However, small
∗ Corresponding author at: Instituto de Telecomunicações, Campus Universitario, Aveiro, Portugal.
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cell technology does not reduce the workload of the network infras-
tructure which can become a bottleneck in densely populated areas.
The EU-funded H2020-MSCA project ‘‘SECRET’’ introduced a system
model which utilizes so-called mobile small cells [4]. These mobile
small cells form a wireless network of small cells and exists entirely of
mobile devices. Data transmissions are established through device-to-
device (D2D) communications (and multiple hops if necessary) without
having to rely on the existing network infrastructure. This system
model is particularly suitable for an urban environment since the high
network density guarantees a communications path between network
subscribers. Technologies such as network coding could be utilized to
provide significant benefits to networks in terms of bandwidth, energy
consumption, delay and robustness to packet losses [5]. This system
model therefore provides additional benefits compared to ordinary
small cells and could potentially function alongside the 5G mobile
network, providing a high level of QoS to communicating network
subscribers which are within relative close proximity while offloading
the network infrastructure.ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2021.06.012
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However, mobile small cells raise significant challenges in terms of
ecurity and privacy. Cryptographic security solutions (e.g., encryption
nd integrity schemes) are capable of solving these as long as they
re supported by a key management scheme [6]. A key management
cheme dictates how cryptographic keys are organized within a net-
ork such that they can be used effectively to secure communication
etween any set of users. Generally, key management schemes rely on
ome form of an online centralized trusted third party (TTP) to provide
rust and security. This TTP is considered trustworthy and secure by
very user inside the network. However, not a single network entity
hould distribute cryptographic keying material in an online fashion
s they are all vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks or physical
ompromise. Enabling secure multi-hop D2D connectivity using mobile
mall cells therefore requires network independent security solutions.
ecurity must be guaranteed by means of a key management scheme
hich decentralizes trust.
In this article, we present the DISTANT (DIStributed Trusted
uthority-based key managemeNT) scheme and is based on our pre-
ious work [7]. The core feature of this scheme is the combination
f threshold secret sharing [8] with self-generated certificates [9,10].
hreshold secret sharing has trust distributing capabilities which allow
ey management services to be provided in a decentralized manner.
urthermore, verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [11,12] and proactive
ecret sharing (PSS) [13,14] provides robustness against malicious ad-
ersaries. The network nodes, defined as a mobile device in possession
f a network subscriber, are provided with proxy keys that allows
hem to issue and sign certificates for themselves as if they were
ssued by the TTP. These proxy keys enable non-interactive certificate
pdates and reduce the communication overhead. DISTANT’s primary
ocus has been on minimizing the communications overhead as this
estriction remains relevant over time whereas the computational and
emory storage overheads become less of an issue as technology
mproves. The proposed protocols are evaluated analytically for its
ecurity strength and its performance. Results show that the protocols
re mathematically sound and that DISTANT provides a higher level of
ecurity and in many cases a reduction in communication overheads
ompared to related works. To sum up our main contributions:
• We designed a novel and decentralized key management scheme
that is capable of supporting cryptographic security solutions
(e.g., encryption and integrity schemes) to secure Beyond 5G
wireless mobile small cells in dense, urban environments.
• The key management scheme is the first of its kind to be resistant
to all the relevant malicious attacks, specified in the adversarial
model.
• We provided guidelines for selecting an appropriate security
threshold, based on the size and node density of the network
through performed simulations.
• We evaluated and compared the performance of our novel key
management scheme with related key management schemes and
found the design to be either equally or more efficient from a
communication overhead perspective.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. A review
f related works is provided in Section 2. The details of the system
odel is covered in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 cover the adversarial
odel and security objectives, respectively. Details of the proposed key
anagement scheme is covered in Section 6, followed by the security
nalysis in Section 7 and the performance evaluation in Section 8.
inally, our conclusions are covered in Section 9.
. Related work
Research into decentralized and self-organized key management so-
utions took off around the turn of the century when the concept of the
obile ad hoc network (MANET) was introduced. Providing security in
uch networks has been a challenge since ordinary networks generally219Table 1









Luo et al. [15,16] 3 ✓a ✓
Deng et al. [18] 1 ✗ ✗
da Silva et al. [19] 1 ✗ ✗
Zhang et al. [20] 2 ✗ ✗
Li et al. [21] 2 ✓b ✓
Gharib et al. [22] 2 ✗ ✗
Lai et al. [23] 3 ✗ ✗
aVerifiability is limited to the combined key management service. The inability to
verify partial key management services prevents the detection of malicious servers.
bVerifiability is limited to the distributed key establishment protocol. Their distributed
secret share establishment protocol and the secret share updating protocol lack
verifiability.
have access to a secure and reliable TTP. The lack of such a TTP in
MANETs required security researchers to come up with novel key man-
agement schemes to provide secure multi-hop D2D communications.
Our system model is similar to that of a MANET (with a few exception)
and are therefore inspired by those key management solutions. The
recent survey [6] identified that the fully distributed TTP (FD-TTP)-
based key management solution, originally proposed for MANETs, is
the most suitable candidate to establish secure communication in our
system model.
The FD-TTP-based key management solution was proposed by Luo
et al. [15,16]. Traditionally, a centralized TTP is in possession of
a master key pair that is used to provide key management services
(e.g., issue certificates or generate and distribute private keys). In this
solution, the master private key is split into shares using threshold
secret sharing techniques [8]. These shares are then distributed to a
proper subset of nodes, called servers, such that a threshold amount
of them can collaboratively provide the key management service dur-
ing network operation. However, the use of a distributed TTP comes
with a variety of security challenges which must be addressed. The
incorporation of VSS [11,12] allows joining nodes to verify that an hon-
est key management service is provided. Therefore, malicious servers
can be detected. The incorporation of PSS [13,14] allows servers to
periodically update their shares, protecting the secrecy of the master
private key in long-lasting networks. Finally, a malicious server that
manages to compromise enough shares of the master private key,
enabling its reconstruction, is capable of impersonating the FD-TTP.
The trust level [17] of the FD-TTP describes the malicious capabilities
in case of compromise. The malicious capabilities are most severe
at level 1 and the least severe (and even detectable) at level 3. A
key management scheme with an FD-TTP that reaches trust level 3 is
therefore the most desirable, since it provides an additional layer of
security. More details about the relevant attacks and security objectives
are covered in Sections 4 and 5 , respectively. Unfortunately, neither
of the previously proposed schemes that follow the FD-TTP-based key
management solution satisfies all the security objectives. The security
drawbacks of these schemes are summarized in Table 1.
The initial proposal by Luo et al. [15,16] is based on traditional
public key infrastructure (PKI). In this cryptographic infrastructure,
every network node generates their own public–private key pair and
requests the FD-TTP to certify its public key. Upon receiving a threshold
amount of partially signed certificates, the network node combines
these to obtain its issued certificate. Unfortunately, it was demonstrated
in [24] that network nodes are unable to verify whether the obtained
partial certificates and partial secret shares are correct. This allows a
malicious server to provide a faulty key management service without
being detected.
Deng et al. [18] and da Silva et al. [19] proposed FD-TTP-based
key management schemes that are based on identity-based public key
cryptography (PKC). In this cryptographic infrastructure, the node’s



































identity (e.g., MAC address or phone number) is used as the user’s pub-
lic key. A node’s private key can be computed using the master private
key; thus, every node must request the FD-TTP for pieces of its private
key. This cryptographic infrastructure achieves only Girault’s trust
level 1 [17,25]. Therefore, a compromised FD-TTP gains tremendous
power to launch malicious attacks without being detected. It has been
suggested that schemes based on identity-based PKC are more suitable
in small and closed networks with limited security requirements due to
this drawback [20,21].
Zhang et al. [20], Li et al. [21], Gharib et al. [22] and Lai et al. [23]
proposed FD-TTP-based key management schemes that are based on
certificateless PKC [26]. This cryptographic infrastructure is a hybrid
between traditional PKI and identity-based PKC. A network node es-
sentially combines the self-generated public–private key pair with an
identity-based public–private key pair. The self-generated public key
and the node’s identity are combined into the node’s public key and
the self-generated private key and the identity-based partial private
key (obtained from the FD-TTP) are combined into the node’s private
key. Al-Riyami et al. [26] showed that the TTP can reach either trust
level 2 or trust level 3, depending on the key generation technique.
By inspection, we found that [20–22] only reach FD-TTP trust level
2, whereas the scheme by Lai et al. [23] reaches trust level 3. This
means that only their scheme is capable of detecting malicious activities
in case the network becomes compromised. Unfortunately, their key
management scheme does not incorporate VSS1 or PSS, making their
esign still vulnerable against certain malicious adversaries.
. System model
.1. System description
The system model that consists of virtual mobile small cells for the
ext generation mobile network, was introduced by the H2020-MSCA
roject ‘‘SECRET’’ [4] and is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this model, the
obile network (consisting of macro cells) is virtually partitioned into
network (or cloud) of mobile small cells, containing heterogeneous
obile devices such as smartphones and laptops. Each mobile small
ell has an approximate radius of 50 to 100 m and is controlled and
aintained by a hotspot. This hotspot is a heterogeneous mobile device
hat is selected to become the local radio manager to control and main-
ain the cluster. In addition, each hotspot is controlled by a centralized
oftware-defined controller. Through cooperation these hotspots form
wireless network that has several gateways to the mobile network
sing intelligent high-speed connections. Data traffic between devices
s established through multi-hop D2D communications. This system
odel can function alongside the 5G mobile network, providing a high
evel of QoS to communicating network subscribers which are within
elative close proximity, while offloading the network infrastructure.
he network subscribers can take advantage of communicating through
hese mobile small cells in the one-on-one setting as well as the group
etting, applied to voice calling, video calling, text messaging and
ata exchange (e.g., exchange of data messages, pictures, videos, data
elated to a multi-player game, etc.).
The densification of the urban landscape by means of mobile small
ells provides opportunities for both network operators and network
ubscribers. Network subscribers are provided with an increase in
ata rates and a reduction in power consumption and latency, while
etwork operators benefit from a reduction in signal interference,
etwork offloading and network operating costs. However, many of
hese advantages can be credited to the introduction of ordinary small
ells. Since the strength of a radio signal diminishes with the square of
he distance, replacing large transmissions to and from the base station
y multiple shorter transmissions provide significant energy savings
1 The use of verifiable secret sharing is mentioned; however, it is not
ncorporated in any protocol.220and reduce the amount of interfering radio signals. The energy savings
could then be invested towards enabling higher data rate transmissions.
Furthermore, the physical propagation distance is significantly reduced
when a source node and a destination node are within relative close
proximity and thus reduces latency.
Nevertheless, mobile small cells provide additional advantages.
They can be set up on-the-fly, based on demand, at any place, at any
time, using existing mobile devices. These mobile devices can propa-
gate data through the network using multi-hop D2D communications
and enables network offloading. Densely populated urban environ-
ments would benefit greatly from this as network congestion in these
environments are most prolific. Furthermore, since the mobile small
cells are formed from existing mobile devices, network operators do
not have to install or maintain additional network infrastructure which
reduces the network operating costs. Moreover, the dynamic network
topology supports time and space varying traffic [28]. Finally, network
coding could be utilized to provide significant benefits to networks
in terms of bandwidth, energy consumption, delay and robustness to
packet losses [5].
Recently, the mobile telephony standardization organization 3GPP
introduced the concept of ‘‘Indirect 3GPP Communication’’ to extend
coverage. This is defined as the signaling and communication between
a mobile device and a 3GPP network via one or more relay nodes
in [29]. This concept covers the utilization of multi-hop D2D communi-
cations as covered in mobile small cells, demonstrating its technological
relevance.
3.2. Assumptions
For our key management scheme, we consider a network of mobile
small cells which cover an urban environment. This urban environ-
ment has the highest node density in the center and has a gradually
decreasing node density as we distance ourselves from the center.
The network contains 𝑛 network nodes and the size of the network
is defined as the area within the urban environment in which every
network node generally has at least the threshold 𝑡 amount of neighbors
within its direct transmission range. The network topology is dynamic,
network nodes can move freely inside the network and nodes may
join or leave the network at any time. We assume the existence of a
TTP (e.g., a network operator or a collaborative effort from multiple
network operators) during network initialization to bootstrap an initial
set of nodes. We assume that the transmission range of each node
is equal and that they are capable of sending unicast, multicast or
broadcast messages. We define a unicast message as a message which is
cryptographically secured (i.e., by means of encryption) by the sender
and only one receiver has the corresponding cryptographic keying
material to extract the information from the message. Similarly, we
define a multicast message as a message which is cryptographically
secured by the sender and a set of multiple receivers have correspond-
ing cryptographic keying material to extract the information from the
message. We define a broadcast message as a message which is sent in
plaintext such that every network node within the transmission range
of the sender receives this message. These messages are invulnerable to
malicious message modification attacks when both the sender and re-
ceiver are within each other’s transmission range. We assume that each
of the protocols which involves communication between multiple nodes
remain within each other’s transmission range during the execution of
the protocol. Finally, we assume that network nodes periodically send
beacon messages to informs nearby and incoming nodes that they are
within the boundaries of the network.
4. Adversarial model
In the FD-TTP-based key management solution, that relies on the
distribution of trust through secret sharing techniques, the most impor-
tant aspect of security is the continued secrecy of the master private
M. de Ree, G. Mantas, J. Rodriguez et al. Computer Communications 176 (2021) 218–233Fig. 1. The system model as introduced by H2020-MSCA project ‘‘SECRET’’ [27].key. We discuss, underneath, two types of attacks that are related to
the establishment and maintenance of a secure and trustworthy key
management service and one important and inherent characteristic of
public key cryptographic infrastructures and their impact on providing
security for a FD-TTP-based key management scheme.
Disruptive adversary attack. In the disruptive adversary attack, a mali-
cious server provides a false key management service to a requesting
node. This false key management service can be categorized in the
following two ways:
1. False partial secret share
The disruptive adversary could send a false partial secret share
to a joining node, leading to the creation of an incorrect secret
share. Consequently, this incorrect secret share will cause a well-
behaving server to unknowingly provide false key management
services to joining nodes in the future.
2. False partial keying material
The disruptive adversary could also send false partial keying
material (e.g., a false partially signed certificate or a false partial
private key) to a requesting node, leading to the creation of
incorrect keying material. This is then followed by the inability
to establish a secure communication channel with other network
nodes. Therefore, a disruptive adversary can have crippling ef-
fects on the key management service and prevents nodes from
establishing secure communication.
Mobile adversary attack. In the mobile adversary attack [30], a ma-
licious adversary moves dynamically through the network and com-
promises network nodes, one at a time, with the goal to extract and
collect a threshold amount of shares of the master private key. If the
mobile adversary is successful, it is capable of reconstructing the master
private key. This allows the adversary to impersonate a distributed TTP
and launch a variety of malicious attacks. The severity of these attacks
depends on the public key cryptographic infrastructure of the key
management scheme, as this defines the trust level of the distributed
TTP.
Trust level of the distributed TTP. Girault [17] found that public key
cryptographic infrastructures have a variety of trust levels. He defined
a hierarchy of three trust levels as follows:
1. The TTP knows (or can easily compute) a node’s private key
and can launch identity impersonation attacks without being
detected.2212. The TTP does not know (and cannot easily compute) a node’s
private key but is still able to launch identity impersonation
attacks without being detected.
3. The TTP does not know (and cannot easily compute) a node’s
private key nor is it able to launch identity impersonation attacks
without being detected.
In the event that the master private key is exposed, the adversary in
possession of the master private key is capable of impersonating a
malicious TTP. These malicious capabilities depend on the trust level
of the distributed TTP. This characteristic is important in the design
of a key management scheme as it can provide an additional layer of
security.
5. Security objectives
To prevent the attacks described in the adversarial model, the
following security objectives must be achieved.
The incorporation of verifiable secret sharing. To mitigate the disruptive
adversary attack, a requesting node must be capable of verifying the
correctness of the provided key management service. This becomes
possible by incorporating verifiable secret sharing [11,12] into the key
management design. Furthermore, the detected misbehaving servers
can be removed from the network. Incorporating verifiable secret shar-
ing should therefore discourage servers from providing a false key
management service.
The incorporation of proactive secret sharing. The secrecy of the master
private key must be maintained during the entire network lifetime.
Since the mobile network has a long lifetime, a mobile adversary has an
extensive period of time to make its attack successful. To limit the win-
dow of opportunity, we require network nodes to be proactive when it
comes to maintaining the secrecy of the master private key. Therefore,
network users should periodically update their secret shares [13,14]
such that a mobile adversary is incapable of collecting a threshold
amount of secret shares in between two share updating phases.
The distributed TTP must reach trust level 3. Having a FD-TTP which
reaches trust level 3 provides the highest level of security since it allows
the detection of network compromise. This gives network operator(s)
the ability to reboot the network with enhanced security parameters,
such as a higher security threshold or a reduced interval between share
updating phases. The limited payoff should discourage adversaries from
attempting to compromise the network.




















































6. The DISTANT scheme
The DISTANT scheme, schematically illustrated in Fig. 2, has three
phases. The first phase is the network initialization phase. In this phase,
we rely on a TTP (such as a network operator or a collaborative effort
from multiple network operators) to execute the network setup algo-
rithm and inject trust into the network by bootstrapping an initial set of
nodes. These initial nodes are provided the public network parameters
along with their initial keying material (i.e., a share of the master
private key, a personalized proxy key pair and the public witness
values). After at least a threshold amount of nodes are initialized, the
TTP leaves the network and the network becomes operational in a
self-organized manner.
The second phase is the operational phase. In this phase, network
nodes can use their proxy key pair to issue and update their own
self-generated certificate, as if it was issued directly by the TTP, in
a non-interactive fashion. Any arbitrary set of network nodes can
exchange their self-generated certificates, verify their authenticity, and
establish a secure communication channel. It is also possible for new
nodes to join the network during the operational phase. Joining nodes
can broadcast a joining request to obtain its initial keying material.
The network nodes that are within transmission range of the joining
node and receive the joining request, can use their share of the master
private key to provide partial proxy key pairs and partial shares of the
master private key to the joining node. The joining node can combine
these pieces to establish its own proxy key pair and share of the master
private key.
The third phase is the share updating phase and it is triggered
periodically. In this phase, every network node updates its share of
the master private key. The obtained and updated share will be in-
dependent from its previous shares, effectively preventing a mobile
adversary from successfully collecting a threshold number of shares in
between share updating phases. This provides long-term security for
our network.
6.1. Network initialization phase
The network is initialized by a TTP and a cluster of 𝑡 initial nodes.
The TTP could be a network operator or a collaborative effort from mul-
tiple network operators. We assume the existence of a secure channel
between the TTP and each initial node during this phase. The following
algorithm and protocols are executed during this phase:
1. Network Setup: The TTP executes the network setup algorithm to
define public and private network parameters.
2. Centralized Secret Share Establishment : The TTP computes and
provides each initial node with a personalized secret share of
the master private key.
3. Centralized Proxy Key Pair Establishment : The TTP initiates an
interactive protocol with each initial node to establish their
initial proxy key pair.
6.1.1. Network setup
The network setup algorithm is executed by the TTP. The algorithm
generates, selects and defines public network parameters (i.e., primes
𝑝 and 𝑞, generator 𝑔, security threshold 𝑡, master public key 𝑀𝑃𝐾 and
he set of witness values 𝜔) and public network functions (i.e., hashes
1, ℎ2, ℎ3, signature scheme 𝑆𝐼𝐺 [31,32], public encryption scheme
𝑁𝐶 [33], message authentication code 𝑀𝐴𝐶 [34,35] and symmetric
ncryption cipher 𝐶𝐼𝑃 [36]). These network parameters and func-
ions are published such that every node knows how to perform its
athematical operations. Furthermore, the TTP generates a master
olynomial 𝑓 (𝑥) that defines the master private key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 and allows
he TTP to compute the shares of the master private key for the initial
et of nodes. The technical details are described in Algorithm 1.
222.1.2. Centralized secret share establishment
In this protocol, the TTP bootstraps the network and establishes the
istributed TTP by providing an initial node with a share of the master
rivate key. The TTP computes the share of the master private key for
he initial node by evaluating the master polynomial after which this
s securely transmitted along with the set of witness values (step 1.1).
ue to our incorporation of verifiable secret sharing, the initial node
s capable of verifying whether the provided share is correct (steps 1.2
nd 1.3). Every initial node that obtains a correct share of the master
rivate key is capable of providing a partial key management service
o nodes that wish to join the network during the network operational
hase. These partial key management services include the provisioning
f (i) a partial secret share or (ii) a partial initial proxy key pair. A
hreshold amount of partial key management services converges to a
uccessful key management service, as if this was directly provided
y a centralized TTP. Our secret sharing construction is based on the
ork of Shamir [8] and the verifiability extension is based on the work
f Feldman [11]. The technical details of the protocol is described in
rotocol 1.
.1.3. Centralized proxy key pair establishment
In this protocol, the TTP initiates an interactive protocol with each
nitial node to provide them with their initial proxy key pair and the
ssociated initial commitment value. This initial commitment value
onsists of two partial commitments, one generated by the TTP (step
.1) and one generated by the initial node (step 2.2). The initial
ommitment value is then bound by the TTP to the initial node’s partial
rivate proxy key (step 2.3). The initial node verifies whether the
TP provided an honest key management service by checking that the
inding between its initial commitment and its partial private proxy
ey is correct (step 2.4). This binding technique in our protocol allows
ur scheme to benefit from a FD-TTP with trust level 3 (see Section 7
or more details). Finally, the initial node computes its initial proxy key
air (step 2.5).
The initial public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙,0 and the initial private proxy key
𝐾 𝑙,0 are long-lasting keys and should never be disclosed. Instead, these
re used as key derivation keys for issuing self-generated certificates.
his is covered in more detail in Protocol 3, the certificate issuing
nd updating protocol. After the cluster of 𝑡 initial nodes obtained
heir shares of the master private key and their initial keying material
i.e., the initial commitment, private proxy key and public proxy key),
he network becomes self-organized and is no longer reliant on a
entralized TTP. The TTP destroys the master polynomial and its secret
oefficients after which it leaves the network. The technical details
f our interactive centralized proxy key pair establishment protocol
etween the TTP and initial node 𝑁𝑙 is described in Protocol 2.
6.2. Operational phase
With a cluster of 𝑡 nodes initialized by the TTP, the network enters
the operational phase. During the operational phase, the network and
the key management functions in a fully self-organized manner. We
define a network node to be a fully initialized node that obtained its
personalized share of the master private key and obtained its initial
proxy key pair. By this definition, the network node is also member of
the FD-TTP. The following protocols are executed during this phase:
1. Certificate Issuing & Updating : Network nodes can issue and pe-
riodically update their own public key certificate in a non-
interactive fashion.
M. de Ree, G. Mantas, J. Rodriguez et al. Computer Communications 176 (2021) 218–233Fig. 2. The schematic design of DISTANT with protocol localization.Network Setup Algorithm
1. First, the TTP generates two large primes 𝑝 and 𝑞 such that 𝑞|𝑝 − 1 and selects a generator 𝑔 of cyclic subgroup G ⊂ Z∗𝑝 which has
order 𝑞. The TTP also selects security parameter 𝑡, the threshold value that indicates the number of network nodes required to provide
a successful key management service.






𝑖 ∈ Z∗𝑞 [𝑥]. (1)
3. The TTP defines the master private key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 = 𝑓 (0), the master public key 𝑀𝑃𝐾 = 𝑔𝑀𝑆𝐾 (mod 𝑝), the public witness values
𝜔 = {𝑤𝑖 ≡ 𝑔𝑎𝑖 (mod 𝑝)} for 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 − 1.
4. The TTP defines three collision-free hash functions (ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3), a secure DLP-based signature 𝑆𝐼𝐺 (e.g., Schnorr [31], DSA [32])
and encryption 𝐸𝑁𝐶 (e.g., ElGamal [33]) scheme, a forge-resistant message authentication code 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (e.g., HMAC [34,35]), and
a semantically secure symmetric encryption cipher 𝐶𝐼𝑃 (e.g., AES [36]).
5. Finally, the TTP publishes the public network parameters (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑀𝑃𝐾, ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3, 𝑆𝐼𝐺, 𝐸𝑁𝐶, 𝑀𝐴𝐶, 𝐶𝐼𝑃 ) in a secure, public
space.
Algorithm 1: The TTP executes the network setup algorithm to establish and define the network parameters.1. Centralized Secret Share Establishment Protocol
1.1. First, the TTP computes the secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑙 for initial node 𝑁𝑙 with identity 𝐼𝐷𝑙 as follows:
𝑠𝑠𝑙 ≡ 𝑓 (𝐼𝐷𝑙) (mod 𝑞). (2)
The TTP securely transmits secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑙 and witness values 𝜔 to node 𝑁𝑙.






𝐼𝐷𝑙 𝑖 (mod 𝑝). (3)
1.3. Finally, each initial node 𝑁𝑙 verifies whether its obtained secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑙 is correct:
𝑝𝑠𝑙
?
≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑙 (mod 𝑝). (4)
If verification is successful, initial node 𝑁𝑙 accepts the obtained secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑙.
Protocol 1: The technical details of the centralized secret share establishment protocol.2. Secure Channel Establishment : Network nodes can exchange their
self-generated certificates and verify the authenticity of received
certificates. The network nodes establish secure communication
channels using the public key on authenticated certificates.
3. Distributed Proxy Key Pair Establishment : Nodes can join the
network by requesting a threshold amount of nearby network223nodes for key management services. The nearby network nodes
can collectively provide the joining node with its initial proxy
key pair.
4. Distributed Secret Share Establishment : Nodes can join the network
by requesting a threshold amount of nearby network nodes
for key management services. The nearby network nodes can















2. Centralized Proxy Key Pair Establishment Protocol
2.1. First, the TTP selects a random secret value 𝑠𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃 ∈ Z∗𝑞 and computes partial commitment value 𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 as follows:
𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 ≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃 (mod 𝑝). (5)
The TTP securely transmits the partial commitment 𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 to initial node 𝑁𝑙.
2.2. Initial node 𝑁𝑙 selects a random secret value 𝑠𝑣𝑙 ∈ Z∗𝑞 to obtain its own partial commitment 𝑐𝑙. Both partial commitments are then
combined into its initial commitment 𝑐𝑙,0:
𝑐𝑙,0 ≡ 𝑐𝑙 ⋅ 𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 (mod 𝑝) ≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑣𝑙 ⋅ 𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 (mod 𝑝). (6)
Initial node 𝑁𝑙 securely transmits its initial commitment 𝑐𝑙,0 to the TTP.
2.3. The TTP computes the partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃 as follows:
𝑆𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃 ≡ 𝑠𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃 +𝑀𝑆𝐾 ⋅ ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑞). (7)
The TTP securely transmits partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃 to initial node 𝑁𝑙.
2.4. Initial node 𝑁𝑙 checks whether the TTP provided an honest key management service by verifying whether the TTP incorporated the same
random secret value 𝑠𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃 in the establishment of its partial commitment 𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 as well as the partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃 . Initial
node 𝑁𝑙 checks the following:
𝑔𝑆𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃
?
≡ 𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 ⋅𝑀𝑃𝐾ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑝). (8)
2.5. Finally, initial node 𝑁𝑙 utilizes partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃 in establishing its initial proxy key pair. Node 𝑁𝑙 computes its initial
private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 and corresponding initial public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙,0 as follows:
𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 ≡ 𝑠𝑣𝑙 + 𝑆𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃 (mod 𝑞), (9)
𝑃𝐾 𝑙,0 ≡ 𝑔𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 (mod 𝑝). (10)
Protocol 2: The technical details of the centralized proxy key pair establishment protocol.collectively provide the joining node with its secret share of the
master private key, thereby joining the distributed TTP.
5. Certificate Revocation: Network nodes can update their
self-generated certificate frequently, making certificate revoca-
tion redundant. This feature simplifies the key management
design.
6.2.1. Certificate issuing & updating
In this protocol, network nodes issue or update their self-generated
certificate in a non-interactive manner. To execute this protocol, a
node must be in possession of its initial commitment and its initial
proxy key pair. A network node first selects a random secret value
from which it computes a certificate-specific commitment and a cor-
responding certificate-specific proxy key pair. This certificate-specific
proxy key pair is essentially derived from its initial proxy key pair (step
3.1). For a network node 𝑁𝑙, its certificate will contain at least the
following parameters: the identity of the network node, 𝐼𝐷𝑙, its initial
commitment 𝑐𝑙,0, the certificate-specific commitment 𝑐𝑙, the certificate-
pecific public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙 and a timestamp 𝑇𝑆. The network node
ses these parameters and its certificate-specific private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙
s inputs to generate a signature 𝜎 (step 3.2). The network node then
dds the signature to define its self-generated certificate (step 3.3).
he technical details of the certificate issuing and updating protocol
s described in Protocol 3.
.2.2. Secure channel establishment
This protocol describes the process of verifying exchanged self-
enerated certificates such that network nodes can establish a secure
ommunication channel. Thus, we assume that a pair of network nodes
xchanged their self-generated certificates with each other (step 4.1).
he network node first inspects whether the received certificate is still
alid by examining the timestamp (step 4.2). Then, the network node
erifies whether the binding between the published identity, the public
roxy key and the commitments is correct (step 4.3). If this verification
224step is successful, the network node can be confident that the public
proxy key is created by the network node with the identity on the
certificate. Finally, the network node verifies whether the information
on the certificate has not been tampered with and that the signature
is created with the private proxy key that corresponds to the public
proxy key that is published on the certificate (step 4.4). If all these
verification steps are successful, the network node can compute a
pairwise symmetric key for encryption and decryption purposes, and
a pairwise symmetric key for signing and verification purposes. The
pairwise symmetric key is created from the network node’s own private
proxy key (that was used to sign the certificate that it transmitted to
the other network node) and the public proxy key that was published
on the received and verified certificate of the other network node (step
4.5). The technical details of the secure channel establishment protocol
is described in Protocol 4.
This construction enables network nodes to perform authenticated
encryption. The most secure form of authenticated encryption follows
the Encrypt-then-MAC principle, in which a plaintext message is first
encrypted after which the MAC is produced from the resulting ci-
phertext. The ciphertext and MAC are then sent together. This is the
standard method according to ISO/IEC 19772:2009 [37] and is used in
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [38].
6.2.3. Distributed proxy key pair establishment
Nodes are allowed to join the network during the operational phase.
Assuming that at least a threshold amount of network nodes are within
the transmission range of the joining node, key management services
can be provided. In the distributed proxy key pair establishment pro-
tocol, a joining node starts by selecting a random temporary private
key from which it computes the corresponding temporary public key
(step 5.1). This temporary key pair allows the nearby servers to securely
transmit data later on in the protocol. The nearby servers are informed
of the joining node, prompting the establishment of the joining node’s
initial commitment value with partial commitments provided by the
servers (step 5.2) as well as the joining node itself (step 5.3). The nearby
servers are then informed of the joining node’s initial commitment,
from which the servers can compute partial private proxy keys (step





















3. Certificate Issuing & Updating Protocol
3.1. First, network node 𝑁𝑙 selects a random secret value 𝑠𝑣𝑙 ∈ Z∗𝑞 . Then, the network node computes the corresponding commitment 𝑐𝑙,
private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙 and public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙 as follows:
𝑐𝑙 ≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑣𝑙 (mod 𝑝), (11)
𝑆𝐾 𝑙 ≡ 𝑠𝑣𝑙 + 𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 ⋅ ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙) (mod 𝑞), (12)
𝑃𝐾 𝑙 ≡ 𝑔𝑆𝐾 𝑙 (mod 𝑝). (13)
3.2. Network node 𝑁𝑙 creates a signature 𝜎 on the certificate using its private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙. The contents of the certificate are the inputs
to create the signature:
𝜎 = 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑆𝐾 𝑙 (𝐼𝐷𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙,0, 𝑐𝑙 , 𝑃𝐾 𝑙 , 𝑇 𝑆), (14)
where timestamp 𝑇𝑆 represents the validity period or expiration time of the certificate.
3.3. Finally, network node 𝑁𝑙 defines its self-generated certificate as:
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑙 = {𝐼𝐷𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙,0, 𝑐𝑙 , 𝑃𝐾 𝑙 , 𝑇 𝑆, 𝜎}. (15)
Self-generated certificate 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑙 can be exchanged with other network nodes to establish secure unicast channels.
Protocol 3: The technical details of the certificate issuing & updating protocol.4. Secure Channel Establishment Protocol
4.1. First, network nodes 𝑁𝑙 and 𝑁𝑘 exchange their self-generated certificates. The following three verification steps are executed by network
node 𝑁𝑘 to authenticate certificate 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑙.
4.2. Network node 𝑁𝑘 inspects timestamp 𝑇𝑆 to verify that certificate 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑙 has not expired.
4.3. Network node 𝑁𝑘 verifies whether the binding between identity 𝐼𝐷𝑙, public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙, and commitments 𝑐𝑙 and 𝑐𝑙,0 is correct by
checking whether both terms in the equation underneath are equivalent:
𝑃𝐾 𝑙
?
≡ 𝑐𝑙 ⋅ (𝑐𝑙,0 ⋅𝑀𝑃𝐾ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0))ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙 ) (mod 𝑝). (16)
4.4. Network node 𝑁𝑘 verifies whether the information on the certificate has not been tampered with and that the certificate has been signed
by the proxy private key that corresponds to public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙:
𝜎
?
= 𝑆𝐼𝐺−1𝑃𝐾 𝑙 (𝐼𝐷𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙,0, 𝑐𝑙 , 𝑃𝐾 𝑙 , 𝑇 𝑆), (17)
where 𝑆𝐼𝐺−1 represents the verification algorithm of a signature scheme.
4.5. If network node 𝑁𝑘 has been able to execute each verification step successfully, it computes two shared symmetric keys. The shared
symmetric encryption and decryption key 𝐾𝐸(𝑘,𝑙) and the shared symmetric signing and verification key 𝐾𝑆(𝑘,𝑙):
𝐾𝐸(𝑘,𝑙) = ℎ2(𝑃𝐾 𝑙𝑆𝐾𝑘 (mod 𝑝)). (18)
𝐾𝑆(𝑘,𝑙) = ℎ3(𝑃𝐾 𝑙𝑆𝐾𝑘 (mod 𝑝)). (19)
These symmetric keys enable any two network nodes to securely communicate.
Protocol 4: The technical details of the secure channel establishment protocol..4). These partial private proxy keys are securely transmitted using
he joining node’s temporary public key. The joining node then verifies
hether the partial private proxy keys have been honestly generated
ith the server’s share of the master private key (step 5.5). Once the
oining node received a threshold amount of correct partial private
roxy keys, it can compute its initial private proxy key and its corre-
ponding initial public proxy key (step 5.6). The technical details of the
istributed proxy key pair establishment protocol, for joining node 𝑁𝑙
nd the set of nearby servers denoted by 𝜙, are described in Protocol
.
.2.4. Distributed secret share establishment
This protocol can directly follow the distributed proxy key pair
stablishment protocol such that the same set of servers can provide
he joining node with its share of the master private key. In such case,
he joining node previously received the self-generated certificates of
hese servers and have established secure unicast channels. For the
ervers to maintain the secrecy of their own share, they must perform
shuffling mechanism. Therefore, the joining node broadcasts the set
f certificates from its nearby servers (step 6.1) of which every server
hooses a random assisting server’s certificate to perform the shuffling
echanism with (step 6.2). Each server generates a shuffle value that225is securely transmitted to the assisting server (step 6.3). One server
adds and the assisting server subtracts the shuffle value (step 6.4) and
computes its shuffled partial secret share (step 6.5). These are securely
transmitted to the joining node that combines them together (step
6.6) and verifies its correctness (step 6.7). The technical details of the
distributed secret share establishment protocol, for joining node 𝑁𝑙 and
the set of nearby servers denoted by 𝜙, are described in Protocol 6.
6.2.5. Certificate revocation
Certificate revocation is an important key management feature and
requires mechanisms for the following scenarios:
1. Network nodes require a mechanism in which they can revoke
their own certificate when they believe that its key pair has been
compromised.
2. Network nodes require a mechanism in which they can accuse
and revoke the certificate of a network node which is behaving
suspiciously and may have been compromised.
3. A mechanism is required which informs all the network nodes
about recently revoked certificates.
4. A node which joins the network must also be provided with a
list of revoked unexpired certificates.
It is important to notice that certificate revocation is important when
certificates have become compromised long before their expiration






















5. Distributed Proxy Key Pair Establishment Protocol
5.1. First, joining node 𝑁𝑙 selects a random temporary private key 𝑆𝐾𝑙 ∈ Z∗𝑞 and computes corresponding public key:
𝑃𝐾 𝑙 ≡ 𝑔𝑆𝐾 𝑙 (mod 𝑝). (20)
Joining node 𝑁𝑙 broadcasts its identity 𝐼𝐷𝑙 and temporary public key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙 to nearby servers 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙.
5.2. Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 selects a random secret value 𝑠𝑣𝑘 ∈ Z∗𝑞 and computes the partial initial commitment value 𝑐𝑘:
𝑐𝑘 ≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑣𝑘 (mod 𝑝). (21)
Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 then broadcasts its certificate 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑘, partial initial commitment 𝑐𝑘 and witness values 𝜔. The exchange of the joining
node’s temporary public key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙 and the certificates 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑘 of the nearby servers allows for the establishment of secure unicast channels
between the joining node and its servers.
5.3. Joining node 𝑁𝑙 selects a random secret value 𝑠𝑣𝑙 ∈ Z∗𝑞 to compute its own partial commitment 𝑐𝑙. Its own partial commitment and 𝑡
received partial commitments are then combined into its initial commitment 𝑐𝑙,0:




𝜆𝜙𝑘 (0) (mod 𝑝), (22)







Joining node 𝑁𝑙 broadcasts its initial commitment value 𝑐𝑙,0.
5.4. Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 computes the partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑘 as follows:
𝑆𝐾𝑘 ≡ 𝑠𝑣𝑘 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘 ⋅ ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑞), (24)
Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 securely transmits partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑘 to joining node 𝑁𝑙.
5.5. Joining node 𝑁𝑙 verifies whether each received partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑘 is correct by verifying the binding between corresponding
partial private proxy keys 𝑆𝐾𝑘 and partial commitments 𝑐𝑘:
𝑔𝑆𝐾𝑘
?
≡ 𝑐𝑘 ⋅ 𝑝𝑠𝑘ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑝), (25)
where 𝑝𝑠𝑘 represents the public share of server 𝑁𝑘, described in Eq. (3).
5.6. Finally, joining node 𝑁𝑙 combines the 𝑡 verified partial private proxy keys 𝑆𝐾𝐾 to establish its initial proxy key pair. Joining node 𝑁𝑙
computes its initial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 and corresponding initial public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙,0:





𝑘 (0)) (mod 𝑞), (26)
𝑃𝐾 𝑙,0 ≡ 𝑔𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 (mod 𝑝). (27)
The established proxy key pair does not require verification, since the partial private proxy keys were already verified.
Protocol 5: The technical details of the distributed proxy key pair establishment protocol.ate. Therefore, if we limit the period of time between certificate
ompromise and certificate expiration, certificate revocation becomes
edundant [23,39]. In our DISTANT scheme, we take advantage of the
act that self-generated certificates can be updated non-interactively.
herefore, we proposed that these certificates are updated frequently
e.g., daily) to limit the time between certificate compromise and cer-
ificate expiration. The frequent updating of self-generated certificates
nly causes a minor computational overhead increase while alleviat-
ng the key management from complicated and expensive certificate
evocation mechanisms.
.3. Share updating phase
The network alternates between the operational phase and the share
pdating phase. This phase only contains the share updating protocol
n which every network node will be provided with a new and inde-
endent secret share of the master private key. This makes a collection
f less than 𝑡 secret shares, collected by a mobile adversary [30]
n the previous operational phase, unusable in the reconstruction of
he master private key. This phase is therefore necessary to maintain
ong-term security.
.3.1. Share updating
The share updating protocol is triggered by the mobile network or
he software-defined controller. This entity can transmit a signal to the
luster head of a mobile small cell which then informs the members
226of that mobile small cell to initiate the share updating protocol. The
protocol is initiated by having each network node within this cluster
broadcast their self-generated certificate to establish secure unicast
channels between the cluster nodes (step 7.1). Each cluster node then
generates a random update polynomial with its leading coefficient
being 0, allowing the update of secret shares without updating the
master key pair (step 7.2). Based on the update polynomial, each
cluster node computes update witness values (step 7.3) and partial
update shares (step 7.4) for every other cluster node. These are securely
transmitted and verified (step 7.5). Failing to verify the correctness of
a partial update share prompts an accusation procedure. The details of
this accusation procedure is covered in [13,14]. When no accusation
procedures are prompted, every cluster node computes its updated
secret share (step 7.6) and the updated witness values (step 7.7). The
technical details of the share updating protocol, initiated by a cluster
of 𝑡 network nodes denoted by 𝜙, are described in Protocol 7.
After this cluster of 𝑡 network nodes has their secret shares updated,
they broadcast a notification such that other nearby network nodes
can request to have their share updated. These shares are updated
according to the distributed secret share establishment protocol. The
requesting node is therefore required to be within transmission range
of a cluster of 𝑡 network nodes with updated secret shares. This process
continues until every network node has their share updated.
7. Security analysis
In this section, we prove that our key management scheme satisfies
the proposed security objectives:















6. Distributed Secret Share Establishment Protocol
6.1. First, joining node 𝑁𝑙 broadcasts the set of certificates from its nearby servers 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙:
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝜙 = {𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑘 | 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙}. (28)
6.2. Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 selects a random server 𝑁𝑗 ∈ 𝜙 to perform the shuffling mechanism with. Server 𝑁𝑘 selects a random shuffle value
𝛿𝑘,𝑗 ∈ Z∗𝑞 and defines the random shuffle value for 𝑁𝑗 as:
𝛿𝑗,𝑘 = −𝛿𝑘,𝑗 (mod 𝑞). (29)
Server 𝑁𝑘 encrypts 𝛿𝑗,𝑘 such that only server 𝑁𝑗 can decrypt it. Server 𝑁𝑘 then securely transmits a 3-tuple with its identity 𝐼𝐷𝑘, the
identity of the assisting server 𝐼𝐷𝑗 and the encrypted shuffle value 𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝛿𝑗,𝑘) to joining node 𝑁𝑙.
6.3. Joining node 𝑁𝑙 broadcasts the set of encrypted shuffle values:
𝛿𝜙 = {(𝐼𝐷𝑘, 𝐼𝐷𝑗 , 𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝛿𝑗,𝑘)) | 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙}. (30)
6.4. Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 inspects the received tuples and decrypts any encrypted shuffle values that are intended for it. Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 then sums
up all collected shuffle values:
𝛿𝑘 ≡ 𝛿𝑘,𝑗 +
∑
𝑁𝑖∈𝜙
𝛿𝑘,𝑖 (mod 𝑞). (31)
6.5. Server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 computes the shuffled partial secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑘,𝑙:
𝑠𝑠𝑘,𝑙 ≡ 𝑠𝑠𝑘 ⋅ 𝜆
𝜙
𝑘 (𝐼𝐷𝑙) + 𝛿𝑘 (mod 𝑞), (32)
where 𝜆𝜙𝑘 (𝑥) represents the Lagrange coefficient as defined in Eq. (23). Server 𝑁𝑘 then securely transmits the shuffled partial secret share
𝑠𝑠𝑘,𝑙 and witness values 𝜔 to joining node 𝑁𝑙.




𝑠𝑠𝑘,𝑙 (mod 𝑞). (33)
6.7. Finally, joining node 𝑁𝑙 verifies whether its secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑙 is correct:





𝐼𝐷𝑙 𝑖 (mod 𝑝), (34)
where 𝑝𝑠𝑙 represents the public share of 𝑁𝑙 and 𝑤𝑖 represent the public witness values.











• our key management scheme is resilient against disruptive adver-
saries to establish a trustworthy key management service,
• our key management scheme is resilient against mobile adver-
saries to provide long-term network security, and
• our key management scheme reaches trust level 3 to provide an
additional layer of security against network compromise.
Furthermore, we present the simulation results that give insight into
electing a proper security threshold for various network densities. This
s important since every urban environment is unique and has their own
ndividual mobile node densities. Therefore, a proper security threshold
ust be chosen such that the security level of the network is maximized
hile also guaranteeing that every network node has enough servers
ithin its transmission range to be provided with key management
ervices.
.1. Security evaluation against disruptive adversaries
In the following three theorems, we prove that our key management
cheme is resilient against disruptive adversaries providing false key
anagement services. This applies to both the key management service
n which nodes request their share of the master private key and the
ey management service in which nodes request the establishment of
heir initial proxy key pair.
heorem 1. Any individual network node 𝑁𝑙 can verify that the provided
key management service from the distributed secret share establishment
protocol by the set of servers 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 where |𝜙| ≥ 𝑡 has been trustworthy,
i.e., the network node 𝑁𝑙 can verify that obtained secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑙 is correct.
Proof. We prove this theorem by showing that network node 𝑁𝑙 can
utilize the public witness values 𝑤𝑖 ∈ 𝜔 to pre-compute its public
share 𝑝𝑠𝑙. The key management service has been trustworthy if and
only if the provided secret share 𝑠𝑠 corresponds to the pre-computed𝑙
227public share 𝑝𝑠𝑙. This proves that the servers 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 used their secret
share and correctly applied the shuffling values during the execution of
the distributed secret share establishment protocol. We prove that the
network node 𝑁𝑙 is able to verify this mathematical correspondence
between its public share 𝑝𝑠𝑙, secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑙 and the public witness






























𝑘 (𝐼𝐷𝑙 )+𝛿𝑘) (mod 𝑝) (46)
≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑙 (mod 𝑝) □ (47)
heorem 2. Any individual network node 𝑁𝑙 can verify that the provided
ey management service from the distributed proxy key pair establishment
rotocol by the set of servers 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 where |𝜙| ≥ 𝑡 has been trustworthy,
.e., the network node 𝑁𝑙 can verify that obtained initial proxy key pair
𝑃𝐾𝑙,0, 𝑆𝐾𝑙,0) is correct.
roof. We prove this theorem in a similar fashion as we did for
heorem 1. We prove that the key management service has been
rustworthy if and only if every server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 used their secret share
𝑠𝑘 in the establishment of the partial private keys 𝑆𝐾𝑘. We prove that
he network node 𝑁𝑙 is able to verify this mathematical correspondence
etween its initial public proxy key 𝑃𝐾 𝑙,0, its initial private proxy key
𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 and its initial commitment 𝑐𝑙,0 through a series of mathematical
equivalences:
𝑃𝐾 ≡ 𝑐 ⋅𝑀𝑃𝐾ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑝), (48)𝑙,0 𝑙,0
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7.1. First, each network node 𝑁𝑙 ∈ 𝜙 broadcasts its certificate 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 𝑙 such that every network node within the cluster can establish secure
unicast channels with each other.
7.2. Each network node 𝑁𝑙 ∈ 𝜙 generates an update polynomial 𝑓𝑙(𝑥) of degree 𝑡 − 1 with random coefficients 𝑎𝑖 from finite field Z∗𝑞 and






𝑖 ∈ Z∗𝑞 [𝑥]. (35)
7.3. Each network node 𝑁𝑙 ∈ 𝜙 computes the 𝑡 − 1 corresponding update witness values 𝑤𝑖,𝑙. The set of update witness values generated by
network node 𝑁𝑙 is denoted as 𝜔𝑙:
𝜔𝑙 = {𝑤𝑖,𝑙 ≡ 𝑔𝑎𝑖 (mod 𝑝)} for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 − 1. (36)
7.4. Each network node 𝑁𝑙 ∈ 𝜙 computes partial update shares 𝑠𝑠𝑙,𝑘 for every network node 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 (including itself) and encrypts these such
that only intended network node 𝑁𝑘 can retrieve it:
𝑠𝑠𝑙,𝑘 ≡ 𝑓𝑙(𝐼𝐷𝑘) (mod 𝑞). (37)
𝑒𝑙,𝑘 ≡ 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝐾𝐸(𝑙,𝑘) (𝑠𝑠𝑙,𝑘) for all 𝑘 ≠ 𝑙. (38)
Then, network node 𝑁𝑙 broadcasts a message containing its identity 𝐼𝐷𝑙, the set of update witness values 𝜔𝑙, the set of encrypted partial
update shares 𝑒𝑙,𝑘 and a signature.









𝐼𝐷𝑙 𝑖 (mod 𝑝). (39)
7.6. Each network node 𝑁𝑙 ∈ 𝜙 computes its updated secret share by combining its current secret share with the 𝑡 partial update shares.
𝑠𝑠𝑙 ≡ 𝑠𝑠𝑙 +
∑
𝑁𝑘∈𝜙
𝑠𝑠𝑘,𝑙 (mod 𝑞). (40)
7.7. Each network node 𝑁𝑙 ∈ 𝜙 computes the updated witness values by combining the current witness values with the 𝑡 sets of update
witness values and redefines 𝜔 as:
𝜔 = {𝑤0, 𝑤𝑖 ≡ 𝑤𝑖 ⋅
∏
𝑁𝑘∈𝜙
𝑤𝑖,𝑘 (mod 𝑝)} for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 − 1. (41)















𝑘 (0)) ⋅ 𝑔𝑀𝑆𝐾⋅ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0) (49)











𝑘 (0)) (mod 𝑝) (51)
≡ 𝑔𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 (mod 𝑝) □ (52)
Theorem 3. Any individual network node 𝑁𝑙 can detect which server(s)
𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 where |𝜙| ≥ 𝑡 provided a malicious key management service during
the execution of the distributed proxy key pair establishment protocol.
Proof. We prove this theorem in a similar fashion as we did for The-
orems 1 and 2. First, network node 𝑁𝑙 knows the partial commitment
𝑐𝑘 and is able to compute the public share 𝑝𝑠𝑘 of every server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙.
This allows network node 𝑁𝑙 to compute the partial public proxy key
𝑃𝐾𝑘 that corresponds to the partial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾𝑘 that server
𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 is supposed to provide. We prove that the key management
service from server 𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 has been trustworthy if and only if server
𝑁𝑘 ∈ 𝜙 honestly incorporated their secret share 𝑠𝑠𝑘 in computing the
partial private key 𝑆𝐾𝑘 through the following series of mathematical
equivalences:
𝑃𝐾𝑘 ≡ 𝑐𝑘 ⋅ 𝑝𝑠𝑘ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑝) (53)
≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑣𝑘 ⋅ (𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑘 )ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑝) (54)
≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑘+𝑠𝑠𝑘⋅ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 ,𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑝) (55)
≡ 𝑔𝑆𝐾𝑘 (mod 𝑝) □ (56)228.2. Security evaluation against mobile adversaries
In the following two theorems, we prove that our key management
cheme is resilient against mobile adversaries under the assumption
hat share updating phases are executed prior to any mobile adversary
ompromising and extracting a threshold number of secret shares. We
rove that the updated secret shares are a correct sharing of the master
rivate key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 and that a mobile adversary that collects fewer than 𝑡
secret shares in between share updating phases is unable to reconstruct
the master private key 𝑀𝑆𝐾.
Theorem 4. The updated secret shares, created at the end of each share
updating phase, can be used to reconstruct the original master private key
𝑀𝑆𝐾.
Proof. This is a two-part proof. First, we show that the updated
secret share of any arbitrary network node 𝑁𝑙, denoted by 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑙 , is
efined through the evaluation of a random polynomial with the master
rivate key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 as its leading coefficient. We prove this through the
ollowing series of mathematical equivalences:
𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑙 ≡ 𝑠𝑠𝑙 +
∑
𝑁𝑘∈𝜙
𝑠𝑠𝑘,𝑙 (mod 𝑞) (57)
≡ 𝑓 (𝐼𝐷𝑙) +
∑
𝑁𝑘∈𝜙















𝑖 (mod 𝑞) (60)












As per usual, the master private key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 can be reconstructed by
ombining the secret shares 𝑠𝑠𝑘 from at least a threshold amount of






𝑘 (0) (mod 𝑞), (61)







(mod 𝑞). □ (62)
heorem 5. An adversary who knows less than the threshold number of
ecret shares before any share updating period, cannot determine the master
rivate key 𝑀𝑆𝐾.
roof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assuming that the
dversary gathered 𝑚 < 𝑡 secret shares in between two consecutive
hare updating periods. From the set of 𝑚 secret shares {𝑠𝑠1,… , 𝑠𝑠𝑚},








𝑠𝑠1 = 𝑀𝑆𝐾 + 𝑎1 ⋅ 𝐼𝐷1 + 𝑎2⋯ + 𝑎𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝐼𝐷1𝑡−1
𝑠𝑠2 = 𝑀𝑆𝐾 + 𝑎1 ⋅ 𝐼𝐷2 + 𝑎2⋯ + 𝑎𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝐼𝐷2𝑡−1
⋮
𝑠𝑠𝑚 = 𝑀𝑆𝐾 + 𝑎1 ⋅ 𝐼𝐷𝑚 + 𝑎2⋯ + 𝑎𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑡−1
Based on the fundamental theorem of linear algebra, it is not
possible to solve a system of 𝑚 linearly independent equations with 𝑡
unknowns where 𝑚 < 𝑡. Therefore, the adversary is unable to determine
the master private key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 with fewer than 𝑡 secret shares. □
7.3. Security evaluation against a compromised distributed TTP
In the following two theorems, we prove that a compromised and
malicious TTP is unable to compute any node’s private key and is un-
able to launch identity impersonation attacks without being detected.
This means that the FD-TTP in our key management scheme reaches
trust level 3.
Theorem 6. A compromised and malicious FD-TTP is unable to (easily)
compute the initial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 of any network node 𝑁𝑙.
Proof. This theorem can be proven through the inspection of the
construction of the initial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 of any network node
𝑁𝑙:
𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0 ≡ 𝑠𝑣𝑙 + 𝑠𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃 +𝑀𝑆𝐾 ⋅ ℎ1(𝐼𝐷𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙,0) (mod 𝑞) (63)
The secret value 𝑠𝑣𝑙 of network node 𝑁𝑙 is never disclosed to the mali-
cious TTP. The malicious TTP is only able to estimate the secret value
𝑠𝑣𝑙 by solving the equation underneath. However, this is equivalent to
solving the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, we conclude that the
malicious TTP is unable to (easily) compute a node’s private proxy key.
𝑐𝑙,0 ≡ 𝑐𝑙 ⋅ 𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑃 (mod 𝑝) ≡ 𝑔𝑠𝑣𝑙+𝑠𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃 (mod 𝑝) □ (64)
Theorem 7. A compromised and malicious FD-TTP is unable to launch
identity impersonation attacks without being detected.
Proof. As stated by Al-Riyami et al. [26], a scheme that is based on cer-
tificateless PKC can either reach trust level 2 or trust level 3 depending
on the key generation technique. The key generation technique that we
employ includes a binding between the initial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾 𝑙,0
and the initial commitment 𝑐𝑙,0 for the arbitrary network node 𝑁𝑙. This
binding effectively restricts network nodes as they can only create a
single correct initial proxy key pair. This unique proxy key pair is then
used to issue self-generated certificates that are linked to that initial
proxy key pair. c
229For the malicious TTP, it is statistically impossible to generate the
same unique initial proxy key pair as generated by network node
𝑁𝑙. The creation of an alternative initial private proxy key 𝑆𝐾∗𝑙,0
that is linked to an alternative initial commitment 𝑐∗𝑙,0 would lead to
an alternative set of self-generated certificates. Identity impersonation
attacks from a malicious TTP can be detected since there would be self-
generated certificates circulating for the node 𝑁𝑙 with identity 𝐼𝐷𝑙,
but one of the self-generated certificates would contain the original
commitment 𝑐𝑙,0 and the other would contain the fake commitment 𝑐∗𝑙,0.
This indicates malicious activity from the TTP. Therefore, in our key
management design, a compromised and malicious TTP is unable to
launch identity impersonation attacks without being detected. □
7.4. Security threshold versus key management service availability
The deployment of mobile small cells in urban environment re-
quires appropriate network parameters, such as the security threshold
or the time period in between share updating phases. Every urban
environment is unique with their particular mobile node densities and
distributions. Therefore, we ran numerous simulations for eight urban
environments (eight of the largest Portuguese cities) to investigate
how the key management service availability is affected by the secu-
rity threshold. For the execution of these simulations, we made the
following assumptions:
• For each urban environment, we computed the population density
and made the assumption that every citizen possesses, on average,
one mobile device. Therefore, we utilized a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the number of citizens and the number of mobile
devices.
• To estimate the number of servers that are within the transmission
range of a mobile device, we assumed that the transmission
range of every mobile device is equal. Furthermore, we based the
transmission range on the predicted size of the mobile small cell.
As stated in Section 3.1, a mobile small cell has an approximate
radius of 50 to 100 m. If we assume that the hotspot can be at the
edge of its mobile small cell but is still able to control its cluster
through D2D communication, it requires a range of approximately
100 to 200 m to reach all its cluster members. We selected the
transmission range of every mobile device to be the average of
that, thus 150 m.
• The simulated mobile devices were randomly distributed through-
out the network.
We ran simulations for eight of the largest cities in Portugal (Lisbon,
Vila Nova de Gaia, Porto, Braga, Amadora, Almada, Coimbra and
Funchal) with a population density2 varying between 7365 to 449
people per square kilometer. We assumed that every citizen has, on
average, one mobile device and thus simulated networks with node
densities that vary between 7365 to 449 mobile devices per square
kilometer. Networks that have a higher node density leads to network
nodes having more servers within their transmission range to provide
key management services. Therefore, the security threshold can be set
higher in more dense networks without affecting the key management
service availability of its network nodes. These findings are graphically
represented in Fig. 3.
In order to provide sufficient network nodes with an available key
management service, we recommend that about 95% to 98% of all
network nodes should have enough servers within its transmission
range due to the steep reduction in key management service availability
for a slight increase in security. We collected the relevant data for each
of the eight urban environments and summarized them in Table 2,
sorted by network density. Notice that the network density and the rec-
ommended security thresholds to provide 98%, 95%, 90% and 80% key
2 The population densities are computed from the estimated population and
ity area according to Wikipedia.



































Fig. 3. The estimated key management service availability for varying security
threshold levels for eight of the largest Portuguese cities.
Table 2
Simulation results for the deployment of the mobile small cell networking scenario
in eight Portuguese cities. The security thresholds maximize the security level while
simultaneously guaranteeing a high chance of obtaining a successful key management
service.
City Density Threshold 𝑡 to reach a KMS availability of ...
(pop./km2) 80% 90% 95% 98%
Amadora 7,365 466 436 412 388
Porto 6,943 436 406 381 352
Lisbon 5,053 310 285 264 241
Almada 2,479 154 144 134 124
Vila Nova de Gaia 1,794 112 104 98 91
Funchal 1,469 93 88 83 78
Braga 1,050 65 60 55 50
Coimbra 449 28 25 23 21
Fig. 4. The relationship between network densities and the security threshold that
guarantees a high percentage of network nodes to have access to key management
services.
management service availability seem to have a linear relationship. For
any particular node density, the recommended security threshold that
guarantees approximately 98% key management service availability is
about 1∕20th. This linear relationship also means that with a doubling
of the network density, the recommended security threshold is about
twice as large.
To provide proper security thresholds for other urban environments,
we extrapolate our data. This enables the network initiator of any
urban environment with its particular node density to select proper
security thresholds that provide the highest level of security while
simultaneously guaranteeing that a large percentage of the network
nodes have access to obtaining their required key management services.
These results are graphically presented in Fig. 4.
Keep in mind that the security threshold also affects the overhead,
thus it may not always be necessary to maximize the security threshold. f
230For example, a high security threshold increases the communication
overhead since more servers are requested to respond to key manage-
ment service requests. Similarly, the computational overhead increases
since more partial keying materials must be verified and combined in
the establishment of the initial proxy key pair or the secret shares.
Instead, the densest urban environments may prefer to reduce the
security threshold and instead decide to have the secret shares updated
more frequently. For example, if we assume that a mobile adversary
is capable of compromising a stable number of mobile devices per
time period, then the network initiator may prefer to half the security




This section will analyze and compare the communication overhead
for the various protocols in FD-TTP-based key management schemes.
We define the communication overhead as the number of unique mes-
sages which are transmitted to complete a protocol and is independent
of the number of receivers. With this definition, we consider a unicast, a
multicast and a broadcast message to contribute to the communication
overhead by one unique message as these are single transmissions (even
though the number of receivers vary). The estimated communication
overheads can depend on the total number of network nodes 𝑛, the
elected security threshold 𝑡, the average distance between two arbi-
rary network nodes 𝑑 and the number of hops 𝑚 to flood a local area
ith messages. The communication overheads per protocol per scheme
s summarized in Table 3. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare
hese protocols solely by their communication overhead, as some of
hem are insecure and require additional overhead in order to make
hem secure.
.1.1. Initial share & key establishment protocols
For the initial share establishment protocol and the initial key
stablishment protocol, we assume that a cluster of 𝑡 nodes are initial-
zed. We estimate the communication overhead to be the number of
ransmissions required to provide every initial node with their share of
he master private key and their initial key pair.
In our protocol design, we assume that a centralized TTP initializes
he network. This assumption was also made in [15,16,20,22]. In
ach protocol, the centralized TTP would generate a random master
olynomial, define the master key pair, compute the secret share of
very initial node and transmit these by unicast. Therefore resulting
n an overhead of the order of 𝑡. The existence of a centralized TTP
o initialize the network was not assumed in [18,19,21,23]. In their
rotocols, the master key pair and secret shares are established in a
istributed fashion. These protocols have a communication overhead
f the order of 𝑡2.
These protocols are executed only once (during network initializa-
ion) and therefore barely contribute to the communication overhead
f the key management scheme as a whole. Furthermore, it is unfair
o compare the efficiency of these protocols as their overhead mainly
epends on the assumption whether a centralized TTP could perform
he network initialization.
.1.2. Key updating protocol
For the key updating protocol, we assume that the network contains
network nodes. We estimate the communication overhead to be the
umber of transmissions required for every network node to update
heir key.
We proposed a non-interactive key updating protocol, as well as [22,
3], allowing a communication overhead of 0. The other key man-
gement schemes require interaction between a network node and
threshold amount of servers. The key updating protocol from Luo
t al. [15,16] has an overhead of 𝑛 × 𝑡 and the key updating protocol
rom da Silva et al. [19] has an overhead of 𝑛 + 𝑡.

























The communication overhead comparison table of DISTANT and related FD-TTP-based key management schemes. The communication overhead is described as the number of
























Luo et al. [15,16] 𝑡 + 1 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 2𝑑 𝑡 + 1 2𝑡 + 2 (𝑚 − 1)2𝑡2 + 𝑡 3𝑛𝑡 + 4𝑛 + 𝑡
Deng et al. [18] 𝑡2 𝑡2 – 0 𝑛 + 𝑡 + 1 𝑡 + 1 – –
da Silva et al. [19] 𝑡2 𝑡2 𝑛 + 𝑡 0 𝑡 + 1 𝑡 + 1 𝑛𝑡 + 𝑛 + 𝑡2 − 2𝑡 − 1 –
Zhang et al. [20] 𝑡 𝑡 – 2𝑑 𝑡 + 1 𝑡 + 1 – –
Li et al. [21] 𝑡2 𝑡2 – 2𝑑 𝑡 + 1 𝑡 + 1 – 𝑑𝑛𝑡 + 𝑑𝑛 − 𝑑𝑡
Gharib et al. [22] 𝑡 + 1 𝑡 0 2𝑑 5𝑡 + 1 𝑡 + 1 0 –
Lai et al. [23] 𝑡2 2𝑡2 0 2𝑑 2𝑡 + 2 𝑡 + 1 0 –












































8.1.3. Secure channel establishment protocol
For the secure channel establishment protocol, we denote the aver-
age number of hops between two arbitrary network nodes as 𝑑 and
s dependent on the network size. We estimate the communication
verhead to be the number of transmissions required for two arbitrary
odes to establish a secure channel.
Our protocol design, as well as the protocol designs from [15,16,20–
3], two network nodes are required to exchange their keying informa-
ion to establish a secure channel. The keying material from both nodes
herefore traverses on average 𝑑 hops, leading to a communication
verhead of 2×𝑑. The secure channel establishment protocols of [18,19]
have a communication overhead of 0, since their key management
schemes are based on identity-based PKC.
8.1.4. Distributed key establishment protocol
For the distributed key establishment protocol, we assume that
exactly 𝑡 servers are within transmission range of a joining node.
With this assumption, we do not have to bother which 𝑡 servers out
f many are contributing to the establishment of the joining node’s
ey. We estimate the communication overhead to be the number of
ransmissions required to provide a joining node with its initial key
air.
In our protocol design, a joining node initiates the interactive
rotocol by broadcasting a request to the 𝑡 nearby servers. These 𝑡
servers then broadcast a reply with partial commitment values. The
joining node combines these with its own and then broadcasts its initial
commitment value. The 𝑡 nearby servers compute partial private keys
nd securely transmit these to the joining node. Thus, our protocol has
communication overhead of 𝑡 + 3.
The distributed key establishment protocol of the other key manage-
ment schemes follow a similar progression, in which public information
can be broadcasted and 𝑡 secure unicast transmissions from the servers
are required. The protocols from [15,16,19–21] benefit from a lower
communication overhead of 𝑡 + 1, since the distributed TTP is directly
able to provide partial keys. On the other hand, the protocols from
Gharib et al. [22] and Lai et al. [23] have multiple rounds of secure
exchanges, leading to a communication overhead of 5𝑡 + 1 and 2𝑡 + 2,
respectively. Interestingly, Deng et al. [18] mentioned that a joining
node has to disseminate its public key to every network node, which
seems ominous as their scheme is based on identity-based PKC. This
causes their protocol to have a communication overhead of 𝑛 + 𝑡 + 1.
.1.5. Distributed share establishment protocol
For the distributed share establishment protocol, we assume that
xactly 𝑡 servers are within transmission range of a joining node.
ith this assumption, we do not have to bother which 𝑡 servers out
f many are contributing to the establishment of the joining node’s
hare. We estimate the communication overhead to be the number of
ransmissions required to provide a joining node with its share.
In our protocol design, as well as [15,16], a joining node initiates
he interactive protocol by broadcasting a request to the 𝑡 servers
ithin transmission range. These 𝑡 servers then reply with encrypted
nd signed shuffle values. The joining node combines these in a single t
231essage and broadcasts these shuffle values. The 𝑡 network nodes
ecrypt and verify the shuffle values intended for them and incorporate
hese in their computation of a shuffled partial share. Each of the 𝑡
ervers now securely transmits these to the joining node. Thus, our
rotocol has a communication overhead of 2𝑡 + 2.
The protocols as proposed in [18,20–23] are incomplete and in-
ecure. They merely proposed that a joining node would broadcast a
equest to which 𝑡 servers would respond with partial shares, leading
o a communication overhead of only 𝑡+1. They did mention that some
orm of shuffling must be incorporated to protect the secrecy of their
hares, but did not provide any details how to do this. The protocol as
roposed by da Silva et al. [19] is similar to the previously mentioned,
owever their protocol does not require a shuffling mechanism as its
aster polynomial is a bivariate polynomial [40]. Thus, their protocol
as a reduced communication overhead of 𝑡 + 1 while also secure.
.1.6. Key revocation protocol
For the key revocation protocol, we assume that each network node
as 𝑡 servers within its transmissions range, that at least 𝑡 accusations
re required to convict a network node for being malicious, and we
enote 𝑚 to be the number of hops in which a local flooding of
ccusation or revocation messages is taking place. We estimate the
ommunication overhead to be the number of transmissions required
o accuse, convict and disseminate the conviction of a network node.
In our protocol design, as well as [22,23], network nodes are able to
pdate their keying information periodically and in a non-interactive
anner. With frequent updates, there is only a short time period
etween compromise and expiration. This makes certificate revocation
edundant. Thus, our protocol and the protocols in [22,23] have a
ommunication overhead of 0.
Luo et al. [15,16] proposed that a network node is effectively
emoved from the network once its keying information expires. Their
ey revocation protocol aims at preventing a malicious node from
pdating its key. When a network node detects malicious behavior, it
ends an accusation message to every network node within its 𝑚-hop
eighborhood. The value of 𝑚 depends on the time before the malicious
ode’s key expires. Once network nodes receive at least a threshold
mount of accusations, they consider the accused node malicious and
eject any of its key updating requests. The communication overhead
f their key revocation protocol is estimated at (𝑚 − 1)2𝑡2 + 𝑡. The
ey revocation protocol by da Silva et al. [19] also makes use of
ccusations and convictions. Any accusation would be broadcasted to
very honest node by means of flooding and broadcast encryption. Once
network node is accused at least some threshold amount of times, a
oalition of 𝑡 servers creates and signs a conviction message which is
hen broadcasted through the network. The communication overhead
f their key revocation protocol is estimated at 𝑛𝑡 + 𝑛 + 𝑡2 − 2𝑡 − 1.
.1.7. Share updating protocol
For the share updating protocol, we denote the average number of
ops between two arbitrary network nodes as 𝑑 and is dependent on
he network size. We estimate the communication overhead to be the
M. de Ree, G. Mantas, J. Rodriguez et al. Computer Communications 176 (2021) 218–233number of transmissions required for every network node to update
their share of the master private key.
In our protocol design, a cluster of 𝑡 servers broadcast their self-
generated certificates which allow them to securely transmit partial
update shares. Each server creates an update polynomial, computes
partial update shares and update witnesses, and securely transmits
these. Finally, each server which has their share updated broadcasts a
notification that nearby nodes can request to have their share updated.
The nearby nodes essentially follow the distributed share establishment
protocol to obtain their updated share. This generates a communication
overhead of 2𝑛𝑡 + 3𝑛 − 𝑡2 − 2𝑡.
Luo et al. [15,16] also proposed a scalable share updating proto-
col in which a cluster of 𝑡 network nodes collaboratively create an
encrypted and signed update polynomial. This update polynomial is
then propagated through the network. Each network node can then
send a local share updating request in which 𝑡 servers collaboratively
provide the network node with its update share. This protocol has an
estimated communication overhead of 3𝑛𝑡+4𝑛+𝑡. Li et al. [21] proposed
a less scalable share updating protocol in which 𝑡 random nodes are
selected to provide every other network node with its partial update
shares. We estimated the communication overhead of this protocol to
be 𝑑𝑛𝑡 + 𝑑𝑛 − 𝑑𝑡.
Based on our simulation data from Section 7.4, we can approximate
the communication overhead of our protocol as (2∕2000)𝑛2, the protocol
from Luo et al. [15,16] as (3∕2000)𝑛2 and the protocol from Li et al. [21]
as (𝑑∕2000)𝑛2. Based on our assumed transmission range of 150 m, the
protocol from Li et al. [21] would be considered the most efficient for
a network size that is smaller than 600 m2 and the most inefficient for
a network size that is larger than 900 m2. For our purpose, we can
conclude that our share updating protocol is the most efficient.
8.2. Discussion
In our key management scheme, we divide the master private key
𝑀𝑆𝐾 into shares using a univariate polynomial. This has the disadvan-
tage that the distributed share establishment protocol requires a shuf-
fling mechanism to protect the secrecy of the servers’ secret shares [15,
18,21–23]. This shuffling mechanism requires additional interaction
and computation which may be avoided with the use of bivariate
polynomials [19,40,41]. However, the adaptation from univariate to
bivariate polynomials is not trivial as we still require verifiability and
proactivity. An additional benefit is that each partial secret share can be
verified for correctness, therefore directly able to prove the malicious
behavior from a server.
As mentioned previously, our key management scheme is designed
to have a low overhead with the emphasis on communication overhead.
As technology keeps improving, we did not consider computational
overhead and memory storage overhead to be a significant restraint
for mobile small cell networks. However, the computational overhead
and memory storage overhead may be reduced by redesigning the
protocols such that security is based on the discrete logarithm problem
in the elliptic curve group [22]. We plan to examine the computational
overhead of our DISTANT scheme in a future work and whether we can
improve our design from a computational overheads perspective based
on the mentioned protocol redesign strategy.
Finally, we proposed this key management scheme to secure multi-
hop wireless D2D communications between nodes within a network
of mobile small cells and a high node density. Based on this scenario,
we assume that every network node has a connection with the cellular
network. However, the 3GPP has also proposed the use-case in which
network nodes are on the edge of cellular coverage or entirely outside
of coverage [42]. If these nodes are unable to rely on any network
infrastructure, this network of nodes essentially has a MANET struc-
ture. Since we assume existence of network infrastructure and rely on
this network infrastructure to provide routing information to connect
communicating nodes, we did not incorporate any routing mechanisms.
232Zhao et al. [43] proposed KM-SR, a key management and secure routing
integrated framework for MANETs with a distributed TTP and would be
an excellent resource to extend DISTANT to incorporate its own routing
mechanism.
9. Conclusions
A mobile networking scenario which incorporates the use of mobile
small cells can provide major advantages in delivering a high quality of
service. However, the introduction of mobile small cells raise various
security challenges. Cryptographic security solutions are capable of
solving these as long as they are supported by an appropriate key
management scheme. This article proposes DISTANT, the first secure
key management scheme which is particularly designed for this mobile
networking scenario to effectively and efficient support cryptographic
security solutions. Our key management scheme relies on threshold
secret sharing to decentralize trust and utilizes the self-generated cer-
tificates paradigm as a means to provide a high level of security
while keeping the overheads to a minimum. The key management
scheme has been evaluated and compared with seven related key man-
agement schemes from both a security and communication overhead
perspective. We found that our key management scheme reaches the
highest level of security against the appropriately considered adversar-
ial model. Furthermore, the design of the protocols are shown to be
scalable and enables our key management scheme to efficiently support
a network which covers dense urban environments.
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